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Steganography is the art of hiding information in ways that prevent its detection. Though 
steganography is an ancient craft, the onset of computer technology has given it new life. 
Computer-based steganographic techniques introduce changes to digital covers to embed in-
formation foreign to the native covers. Such information may be communicated in the form of 
text, binary files, or provide additional information about the cover and its owner such as 
digital watermarks or fingerprints. This paper explains steganography, provides a brief his-
tory and describes how steganography is applied in hiding information in images. 
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teganography is the art and science of 
writing hidden messages in such a way 
that no one apart from the intended recipient 
knows of the existence of the message; this is 
in contrast to cryptography, where the exis-
tence of the message itself is not disguised, 
but the content is obscured.  
The word "Steganography" is of Greek ori-
gin and means "covered, or hidden writing". 
Its ancient origins can be traced back to 440 
BC. Herodotus mentions two examples of 
Steganography in The Histories of Herodo-
tus. Demeratus sent a warning about a forth-
coming attack to Greece by writing it on a 
wooden panel and covering it in wax. Wax 
tablets were in common use then as re-usable 
writing surface, sometimes used for short-
hand. Another ancient example is that of His-
tiaeus, who shaved the head of his most 
trusted slave and tattooed a message on it. 
After his hair had grown the message was 
hidden. The purpose was to instigate a revolt 
against the Persians. Later, Johannes 
Trithemius's book Steganographia is a trea-
tise on cryptography and steganography dis-
guised as a book on black magic. Generally, 
a steganographic message will appear to be 
something else: a picture, an article, a shop-
ping list, or some other message. This appar-
ent message is the covertext. For instance, a 
message may be hidden by using invisible 
ink between the visible lines of innocuous 
documents.  
The advantage of steganography over cryp-
tography alone is that messages do not attract 
attention to themselves, to messengers, or to 
recipients. An unhidden coded message, no 
matter how unbreakable it is, will arouse sus-
picion and may in itself be incriminating, as in 
some countries encryption is illegal  
Steganographic techniques 
Modern steganographic techniques
•  Concealing messages within the low-
est bits of noisy images or sound files.  
•  Concealing data within encrypted 
data. The data to be concealed is first en-
crypted before being used to overwrite part 
of a much larger block of encrypted data. 
This technique works most effectively where 
the decrypted version of data being overwrit-
ten has no special meaning or use: some 
cryptosystems, especially those designed for 
filesystems, add random looking padding 
bytes at the end of a ciphertext so that its size 
can't be used to know what was the plaintext 
size. Examples of software that use this tech-
nique include FreeOTFE and TrueCrypt.  
•  Chaffing and winnowing  
•  Invisible ink 
•  Null ciphers  
•  Concealed messages in tampered ex-
ecutable files, exploiting redundancy in the 
i386 instruction set. 
•  Embedded pictures in video material 
(optionally played at slower or faster speed).  
•  A new steganographic technique in-
volves injecting imperceptible delays to 
packets sent over the network from the key-
board. Delays in keypresses in some applica-
tions (telnet or remote desktop) can mean a 
delay in packets, and the delays in the pack-
ets can be used to encode data. There is no 
extra processor or network activity, so the 
steganographic technique is "invisible" to the 
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user. This kind of steganography could be in-
cluded in the firmware of keyboards, thus 
making it invisible to the system. The firm-
ware could then be included in all keyboards, 
allowing someone to distribute a keylogger 
program to thousands without their knowl-
edge. 
•  Content-Aware Steganography hides 
information in the semantics a human user 
assigns a datagram; these systems offer secu-
rity against a non-human adversary/warden. 
Historical steganographic techniques 
Steganography has been widely used in his-
torical times, especially before cryptographic 
systems were developed. Examples of his-
torical usage include: 
•  Hidden messages in wax tablets: in an-
cient Greece, people wrote messages on the 
wood, then covered it with wax so that it 
looked like an ordinary, unused tablet. 
•  Hidden messages on messenger's body: 
also in ancient Greece. Herodotus tells the 
story of a message tattooed on a slave's 
shaved head, hidden by the growth of his 
hair, and exposed by shaving his head again. 
The message, if the story is true, carried a 
warning to Greece about Persian invasion 
plans .  
•  Hidden messages on paper written in se-
cret inks under other messages or on the 
blank parts of other messages .  
•  During and after World War II, espionage 
agents used photographically produced 
microdots to send information back and 
forth. Since the dots were typically extremely 
small -- the size of a period produced by a 
typewriter or even smaller -- the stegotext 
was whatever the dot was hidden within. If a 
letter or an address, it was some alphabetic 
characters. If under a postage stamp, it was 
the presence of the stamp. The problem with 
the WWII microdots was that they needed to 
be embedded in the paper, and covered with 
an adhesive (such as collodion), which could 
be detected by holding a suspected paper up 
to a light and viewing it almost edge on. The 
embedded microdot would reflect light dif-
ferently than the paper. 
•  More obscurely, during World War II, a 
spy for the Japanese in New York City, Vel-
valee Dickinson, sent information to accom-
modation addresses in neutral South Amer-
ica. She was a dealer in dolls, and her letters 
discussed how many of this or that doll to 
ship. The stegotext in this case was the doll 
orders; the 'plaintext' being concealed was it-
self a codetext giving information about ship 
movements, etc. Her case became somewhat 
famous and she became known as the Doll 
Woman.Counter-propaganda: During the 
Pueblo Incident, US crew members of the 
USS Pueblo (AGER-2) research ship held as 
prisoners by North Korea communicated in 
sign language during staged photo ops to in-
form the United States that they had not de-
fected, but were instead captured by North 
Korea. In other photos presented to the US, 
the crew members gave "the finger" to the 
unsuspecting North Koreans, in an attempt to 
discredit the pictures that showed them smil-
ing and comfortable.The one-time pad is a 
theoretically unbreakable cipher that pro-
duces ciphertexts indistinguishable from ran-
dom texts: only those who have the private 
key can distinguish these ciphertexts from 
any other perfectly random texts. Thus, any 
perfectly random data can be used as a cover-
text for a theoretically unbreakable steg-
anography. A modern example of OTP: in 
most cryptosystems, private symmetric ses-
sion keys are supposed to be perfectly ran-
dom (that is, generated by a good Random 
Number Generator), even very weak ones 
(for example, shorter than 128 bits). This 
means that users of weak crypto (in countries 
where strong crypto is forbidden) can safely 
hide OTP messages in their session keys. 
Additional terminology 
In general, terminology analogous to (and 
consistent with) more conventional radio and 
communications technology is used; how-
ever, a brief description of some terms which 
show up in software specifically, and are eas-
ily confused, is appropriate. These are most 
relevant to digital steganographic systems.
 The  payload is the data it is desirable 
to transport (and, therefore, to hide). The car-
rier is the signal, stream, or data file into 
which the payload is hidden; contrast "chan-
nel" (typically used to refer to the type of in-
 Revista Informatica Economică, nr. 4 (44)/2007 
 
39
put, such as "a JPEG image"). The resulting 
signal, stream, or data file which has the pay-
load encoded into it is sometimes referred to 
as the package. The percentage of bytes, sam-
ples, or other signal elements which are modi-
fied to encode the payload is referred to as the 
encoding density and is typically expressed as 
a floating-point number between 0 and 1. In a 
set of files, those files considered likely to 
contain a payload are called suspects. If the 
suspect was identified through some type of 
statistical analysis, it may be referred to as a 
candidate. 
Countermeasures 
The detection of steganographically encoded 
packages is called steganalysis. The simplest 
method to detect modified files, however, is 
to compare them to the originals. To detect 
information being moved through the graph-
ics on a website, for example, an analyst can 
maintain known-clean copies of these mate-
rials and compare them against the current 
contents of the site. The differences (assum-
ing the carrier is the same) will compose the 
payload. In general, using an extremely high 
compression rate makes steganography diffi-
cult, but not impossible; while compression 
errors provide a good place to hide data, high 
compression reduces the amount of data 
available to hide the payload in, raising the 
encoding density and facilitating easier de-
tection (in the extreme case, even by casual 
observation). 
Applications 
An example from modern practice 
 
Image of an artic hare. By 
removing all but the last 2 
bits of each color compo-
nent, an almost com-
pletely black image re-
sults. Making the result-
ing image 85 times 
brighter results in the im-
age below. 
    
Image extracted from above image. 
The larger the cover message is (in data con-
tent terms — number of bits) relative to the 
hidden message, the easier it is to hide the 
latter. For this reason, digital pictures (which 
contain large amounts of data) are used to 
hide messages on the Internet and on other 
communication media. It is not clear how 
commonly this is actually done. For example: 
a 24-bit bitmap will have 8 bits representing 
each of the three color values (red, green, and 
blue) at each pixel. If we consider just the 
blue there will be 2
8 different values of blue. 
The difference between say 11111111 and 
11111110 in the value for blue intensity is 
likely to be undetectable by the human eye. 
Therefore, the least significant bit can be 
used (more or less undetectably) for some-
thing else other than color information. If we 
do it with the green and the red as well we 
can get one letter of ASCII text for every 
three pixels. 
Stated somewhat more formally, the objec-
tive for making steganographic encoding dif-
ficult to detect is to ensure that the changes to 
the carrier (the original signal) due to the in-
jection of the payload (the signal to covertly 
embed) are visually (and ideally, statistically) 
negligible; that is to say, the changes are in-
distinguishable from the noise floor of the 
carrier. 
From an information theoretical point of 
view, this means that the channel must have 
more capacity than the 'surface' signal re-
quires, that is, there must be redundancy. For 
a digital image, this may be noise from the 
imaging element; for digital audio, it may be 
noise from recording techniques or amplifi-
cation equipment. In general, electronics that 
digitize an analog signal suffer from several 
noise sources such as thermal noise, flicker 
noise, and shot noise. This noise provides 
enough variation in the captured digital in-
formation that it can be exploited as a noise 
cover for hidden data. In addition, lossy 
compression schemes (such as JPEG) always 
introduce some error into the decompressed 
data; it is possible to exploit this for steg-
anographic use as well. 
 
 
Steganography can be used for digital wa-
termarking, where a message (being simply 
an identifier) is hidden in an image so that its 
source can be tracked or verified. 
In the era of Digital video recorder and de-
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vices like TiVo, TV commercials authors 
have figured out how to make use of such 
devices as well - by putting a hidden message 
which becomes visible when played at 
frame-by-frame speed  
Usage in modern printer 
Steganography is used by some modern 
printers, including HP and Xerox brand color 
laser printers. Tiny yellow dots are added to 
each page. The dots are barely visible and 
contain encoded printer serial numbers, as 
well as date and time stamps. This is another 
way of watermarking. 
Rumored usage in terrorism 
The rumors about terrorists using steg-
anography started first in the daily newspaper 
USA Today on February 5, 2001. The arti-
cles are still available online, and were titled 
"Terrorist instructions hidden online", and 
the same day, "Terror groups hide behind 
Web encryption". In July of the same year, 
the information looked even more precise: 
"Militants wire Web with links to jihad". 
A citation from the USA Today article: 
"Lately, al-Qaeda operatives have been send-
ing hundreds of encrypted messages that 
have been hidden in files on digital photo-
graphs on the auction site eBay.com". These 
rumors were cited many times - without ever 
showing any actual proof - by other media 
worldwide, especially after the terrorist at-
tack of 9/11. 
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